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COMMENTS
An International Drug Administration:




"Given the properties of drugs, the idea of a drug that is both per-
fectly safe and effective, at least with our present knowledge, is but
a dream remembered from imaginings of a Garden of Eden de-
signed for the welfare of man."1
Despite the extensive efforts pharmaceutical companies expend re-
searching, developing, and testing new drugs to ensure their "safety" and
"A.B. 1995, Duke University; Juris Doctorate Candidate 1998, Northwestern University
Schbol of Law. I would like to thank Professor Marshall Shapo, Hina Shamsi, Janette
McMahan, and the 1997-1998 members of the Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business for their comments and suggestions.
'Judith P. Swazey, Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, in THE LIABILITY
MAZE 291, 291 (Peter Huber & Robert Litan eds., 1991) (quoting Rnt J. DuBos, MIRAGE
OF HEALTH: UTOPIAS, PROGREss, AND BIOLOGICAL CHANGE 2 (1987)).
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"effectiveness," there is no way to guarantee complete safety.2 Thus, the
pharmaceutical industry faces an inherent dilemma: While pharmaceutical
products have a high social value because they enable people to live longer,
more productive, pain-free lives, these products also pose serious health
risks to consumers. Pharmaceutical companies have no desire to create
these risks,3 but they are present nonetheless; therefore, there needs to be an
effective system to deal with injuries arising from pharmaceutical products.
The dangers posed by pharmaceutical products differ from those at-
tributable to mistakes in the manufacturing process such as finding a piece
of glass in a jar of mayonnaise.4 Such dangers can be labeled as "non-
generic" because they endanger only a small percentage of a product's con-
sumers.5 Little controversy arises over holding a manufacturer liable for
consumer injuries caused by non-generic dangers because the manufacturer
is clearly at fault. In contrast, the risks associated with pharmaceutical
products are "generic" in nature because they are inherent in the products
themselves rather than a result of a manufacturing flaw or malfunction.
6
Holding manufacturers liable for injuries caused by generic risk prod-
ucts has proven quite controversial because the manufacturer does not ap-
pear to be as clearly at fault as with non-generic risk products. Nowhere
has this controversy been more evident than in pharmaceutical product li-
ability. While pharmaceutical companies make up only a small percentage
of the manufacturing industry, in 1985 alone, the number of suits filed
against pharmaceutical companies was more than double the amount of
claims brought against the rest of the manufacturing industry.7
The pharmaceutical industry, like so many other private industries, has
expanded far beyond national borders. However, the laws governing the
industry have not been as quick to venture outside their respective domains.
The United States, the European Union,8 and Japan have become the pri-
mary players in the international pharmaceutical market.9 Together they
2Opinions on the safety and effectiveness of pharmaceutical products can vary greatly
depending on one's response to the question: safe and effective relative to what?3Basic common sense dictates that if you are trying to sell a product and make a profit,
injuring your consumers is not a good way to encourage sales.4Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and For Strict
Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 857 (1983).5See id.
6See id.7W. Kip Viscusi et al., A Statistical Profile of Pharmaceutical Industry Liability, 1976-
1989, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1418, 1421 (1994). This figure excludes asbestos claims. Id.
at 1422.
8The European Union was formerly known as the European Community, but for uni-
formity purposes, it will be referred to throughout this paper as the European Union.
9Rosemarie Kanusky, Pharmaceutical Harmonization: Standardizing Regulations
Among the United States, The European Economic Community, and Japan, 16 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 665, 667 (1994).
International Drug Administration
18:685 (1998)
account for seventy-five percent of the world's pharmaceutical market and
ninety percent of all pharmaceutical research.10 As previously noted, phar-
maceuticals and product liability go hand in hand. The United States, the
European Union, and Japan have all developed their own product liability
standards based on their unique histories, traditions, philosophies, power
structures, and legal systems. Today, each regime, at least in theory, has
adopted the doctrine of strict liability. However, this standard has been
subject to such varied interpretation and application that, in practice, the
strict liability imposed in Toledo often bears little resemblance to the strict
liability found in Toulouse or Tokyo. To avoid the problems generated by
the inconsistencies and uncertainty in pharmaceutical product liability, a
new international, uniform system of liability should be established for in-
temational pharmaceutical products.
This comment will demonstrate how discrepancies among product li-
ability standards and different interpretations of their application have cre-
ated fear and uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry. This fear has
caused distortions in the market, increased costs for both manufacturers
and consumers, and chilled the research and development of new products.
To combat these problems, this comment proposes that the United States,
the European Union, and Japan work together to create a new international,
uniform system of product liability for pharmaceutical products. Harmo-
nizing the standard of liability for pharmaceuticals among these regimes has
proven inadequate to stop inconsistency and uncertainty. This comment
proposes the creation of an International Drug Administration (IDA), com-
prised of members from different countries that would serve as an interna-
tional regulatory agency promulgating registration and development
requirements for new drugs on the international market. A special subset of
the IDA would serve as an administrative tribunal for liability cases. The
IDA tribunal would provide a uniform system of product liability, compen-
sating consumers for injury but not punishing manufacturers without fault.
Part II of this comment will introduce the current liability standards for
pharmaceutical products in the United States, the European Union, and Ja-
pan, and will explain how these standards developed and how they differ
from each other. Part I will then illustrate how these differences translate
into uncertainty and how that uncertainty negatively affects the pharmaceu-
tical market. Part IV will introduce the concept of international regulation
of the pharmaceutical industry through an IDA. Finally, Part V will explain
how this IDA would act as an administrative tribunal for pharmaceutical
product liability claims. This system would eliminate inconsistency and
uncertainty in product liability and provide a better, more uniform system
of product liability for the pharmaceutical industry.
'oid.
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II. THE CURRENT STANDARDS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND JAPAN: HOW THEY DEVELOPED,
HOW THEY DIFFER, AND WHY
The underlying goal of any product liability system is to protect con-
sumers by providing an incentive for manufacturers to create safe products.
An effective system will provide fair compensation for consumer injury
without unfairly punishing manufacturers. The United States, the European
Union, and Japan have each struggled to achieve the goal of fairly redress-
ing consumer injuries without crippling the pharmaceutical industry in the
process.
A. The Doctrine of Strict Liability in the United States
The U.S. common law, viewed as the champion of the common per-
son,12 has developed a consumer-friendly approach to product liability. In
1944, Justice Roger Traynor introduced the idea of a consumer-friendly
product liability standard in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 13 In 1965,
Justice Traynor's consumer-friendly liability concept was officially adopted
as the doctrine of strict liability in Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.14 In response to a proposal to exclude prescription drugs
from the purview of strict liability, the drafters adopted Comment k which
created a general exemption for "unavoidably unsafe" products.' 5 The Re-
'
2 For a discussion on how law in the United States began to create a feeling of entitle-
ment to justice for all citizens, see Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, "Weightier than a
Mountain": Duty, Hierarchy, and the Consumer in Japan, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45,
59-60 (1996).
13Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944). In his concurring
opinion, Justice Traynor suggested that if a manufacturer introduced its product into the
market knowing it would be used without inspection and a defect caused the product to in-
jure a consumer, then the manufacturer should be absolutely liable. Id. He reasoned that the
manufacturer was in a better position than the public to anticipate and guard against any fu-
ture injuries caused by this defect and that the manufacturer could afford to insure itself
against such risks whereas a consumer might be overwhelmed by the cost of an injury. Id. at
441. Echoes of Justice Traynor's reasoning can be heard in arguments advanced in support
of such theories as accident avoidance and least-cost avoidance.
14RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.15 Page, supra note 4, at 865.
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statement is not binding law, but rather a reflection of common law, and as
such it has been subject to numerous judicial interpretations. 6 Over the
past three decades, courts have altered the legal product liability doctrine
dramatically to make it easier for consumers injured by dru s and other
"unavoidably unsafe" products to recover under strict liability.
In 1997, after thirty years of common law development of strict liabil-
ity under Section 402A, the Restatement (Third) of Torts was adopted. 18
Commentators have suggested that the new Restatement reflects a recent
trend towards shortening the long arm of strict liability. 9 Perhaps it will,
but we must wait to see if the theory translates into practice or if judicial
interpretation continues to be consumer-friendly. °
Comment k: There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful
death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding
the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly pre-
pared and accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is not defective, nor is it un-
reasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like,
many of which for this very reason can not legally be sold except to physicians, or un-
der prescription of also true in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to wvhich, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical expe-
rience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualificationthat they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where thesituation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability or unfoate consequences at-tending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an appar-
ently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.RSTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14, § 402A cmt. k.
6The doctrine of strict liability was designed to allow courts to move away from looking
only at manufacturer fault and to focus on the defectiveness of products themselves. Brown
v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 474 (Cal. 1988). Originally, the drafters of Section 402A in-
tended it to have a narrow focus and "apply only to products with latent manufacturing de-
fects." Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Impact of the New Products Liability Restatement onPrescription Products, 50 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 400 (1995). However, the courts have
extended the application of the strict liability doctrine to include claims based on inadequate
warings and design defects. Id.
7See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that a fail-
ure to warn consumers ws a design defect that made product "unreasonably dangerous");
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Co., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972) (modifying strict liability under §
402A by rejecting requirement that product be "unreasonably dangerous" in favor of only
having to show proximate cause); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (de-
fining "design defect").
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: THE PROPOSED FNAL DRAT ( 997).9 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 399.
19See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 400.
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For over-the-counter drugs, while the new Restatement abandons Sec-
tion 402A's doctrinal label of strict liability,21 it follows 402A's underlying
principle of consumer-friendly recovery.22 Design defect claims under the
new Restatement call for a risk/utility balancing test in which an injured
consumer must prove that a "reasonable alternative design" for the product
exists and that failing to use that alternative design made the product "not
reasonably safe. 23 While this test seemingly creates a tougher burden for
plaintiffs to bear, phrases such as "not reasonably safe" are ripe for liberal
interpretation. Moreover, as the judicial broadening of Comment k and
large jury awards illustrate, judges and juries in the United States have
shown a preference towards injured plaintiffs.
The new Restatement creates special liability standards for prescription
products.2 4 The standard for manufacturing flaws and inadequate warnings
basically follows the common law with only a couple of minor exceptions
for inadequate warning claims .2  However, because the common law has
failed to provide a settled standard for liability in design defect cases, the
drafters devised their own new "super" negligence standard.2 6 This new
standard essentially requires an injured consumer to prove that a drug
should never have been on the market and provides no benefit to any class
of patients.2 7 Once again, although this standard seemingly creates a tough
test for plaintiffs to pass, there is more room for consumer-friendly inter-
pretation than a cursory reading might suggest. For example, what qualifies
as a "therapeutic benefit?" Who qualifies as a "reasonable health care pro-
vider?" Judicial interpretation will inevitably decide.
Despite the adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts which at-
tempts to halt or at least hinder the expansion of strict liability doctrine in
product liability claims, the current liability law for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts in the United States remains consumer-friendly.
21 it allows the court to articulate what the basis for liability is without ever calling it
strict liability. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, § 2(a),(b),(c).22 Claims of manufacturing defects continue to follow Section 402A's strict liability stan-
dard, and the standard for inadequate warning claims remains consistent with Section
402A's duty to warn requirement. Id. § 2(a)(c); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14, at
cmt. j.
23 See RESTATEMENT (TIERD), supra note 18, § 2(b).24See id. § 8.25The Restatement only requires prescription drug manufacturers to directly warn the
"learned intermediaries" who prescribe their products, not the actual consumer. Id. § 8(d)(1).
It adopts the rule that non-compliance with regulatory standards makes a product defective,
but compliance with those standards is only evidence of nondefectiveness. Id. § 7(a).26Id. § 8(c). According to this section, a prescription drug or medical device is not rea-
sonably safe due to defective design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits so that
no reasonable health care provider, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic bene-
fits, would prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.27 Schwartz, supra note 16, at 407.
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B. A Directive for Strict Liability in the European Union
In order to understand how the European Union's current product li-
ability standard operates, it is important to discuss the structure and back-
ground of the European Union. In 1957, several European countries agreed
to join together to form a single market of common trade policies.28 These
nations agreed to harmonize their national laws to facilitate the free move-
ment of goods, people, and capital among participating Member States.29
Each Member State remains an autonomous nation, while agreeing to be
part of a supranational organization and allow one common decision-
making body, the European Commission, to promulgate legislative propos-
als, including those governing trade policies.30 The Council of Ministers
[hereinafter the Council] votes on proposals from the European Commis-
sion and largely enacts legislation through either Regulations or Directives.
31 Once legislation in the form of a Council Directive, is adopted by the
Council, Member States must implement the Directive's policies through
their respective national laws.32
Historically, product liability laws varied tremendously throughout the
European Union. Most Member States' liability laws originated from
civil and common law principles of tort and contract, however, differing
national legal traditions meant the methods by which products were found
defective and manufacturers held liable varied greatly among Member
States.34 In the mid 1970s, the European Union recognized that differences
in Member States' product liability laws hindered free trade.35
28Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
I I [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The fifteen Member States comprising the European Union
are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, and Sweden.29Treaty of Rome, arts. 2, 3.30Treaty of Rome, arts. 4, 5.
3 Regulations are directly applicable to, and bind all Member States. Directives, on the
other hand, are binding on Member States only as to the goals expressed in the Directive;
Member States have discretion to determine the means by which the goals will be achieved.
Treaty of Rome, art. 189.32Treaty of Rome, art. 189.33The standard of traditional fault liability was used by southern Member States. Patrick
E. Thieffry, Strict Product Liability In The EEC: Implementation, Practice, And Impact On
U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 388 PLI/LIT 223, 227 (1990) (reprinted with per-
mission from 25 TORT & INS. L. J. No. 1, (Fall 1989)). Fault liability with a reversal of the
burden of proof was used by northern European Member States. Id. France, Luxembourg,
and Belgium used strict de facto liability based on contracts theory. Id.34For a detailed discussion of how different Member States historically handled product
liability issues, see WILLIAM C. HOFFMAN & SUSANNE HLL-ARNING, GUIDE TO PRODUCT
LIABILrrY IN EUROPE (1994).35Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases: Are
The European Community And Japan likely to Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches
To Defendant Identification?, 15 LoY. L. A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 629, 648-49 (1993).
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Recognition of the negative effects that this fragmentation had on free
trade sparked discussion and debate on a new Directive. The European
Union issued a proposal for a more unified approach to product liability in
1976,36 which was debated and negotiated before the Council for nine years.
The hope was to create a more uniform product liability standard.37 These
discussions resulted in the European Union's 1985 adoption of the "Direc-
tive on the Approximation of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provi-
sions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Provisions"
(Directive).38
The Directive embraces strict liability as the European Union's stan-
dard of product liability.39 Thus, the Directive requires only that a plaintiff
show damage, defect, and a causal connection between the two. 40  The
plaintiff is not required to show fault, and privity of contract is no longer
required to file a product liability claim.4 Moreover, the definition of
"product" includes all movables, 4 even those incorporated inside another
movable or immovable product.43  Safety and consumer expectations are
central themes of the Directive. A consumer expectation test is used to de-
termine whether a product is defective,44 and is an even more liberal test
than the United States' standard, which requires a product to be "unrea-
sonably dangerous." 4  Under the Directive, a defect is established if a
product is used as it was supposed to be used, but performs less safely than
a consumer might reasonably expect.
4 6
361976 O.J. (C 241) 9 (1976).
37Marcy Sheinwold, International Products Liability Law, I TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L.
257, 269 (1988).38 Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Directive].
39 1d. art. 1, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 30. The Directive provides: "producer shall be liable for
damage caused by a defect in his product." Id.
4 Id.
4 1Id. arts. 1, 3, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 30.42The Directive does not clearly define the term "movable"; thus, whether a good is a
movable product will be decided by the applicable national law, which may cause differ-
ences in interpretation of the Directive. Thieffry, supra note 33, at 230.
43Directive, supra note 38, art. 2, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 30. This means a victim will have
a claim under the Directive even if the pharmaceutical product that caused the injury is in-
corporated within an immovable good that would not otherwise be considered a product.
44Id. art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 31:
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to
expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
45See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14, § 402A.
46Directive, supra note 38, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 31.
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The Directive affords producers several defenses to a liability claim.47
One such defense is similar to the "unavoidably unsafe" exception in the
Restatement. A producer can avoid strict liability in the European Union by
proving that, based on the scientific and technological knowledge available
at the time the product was made and introduced to the market, it was im-
possible for the producer to know or discover the defect.48 Commonly re-
ferred to as the "state of the art" defense, it is used by producers to defend
against claims of inadequate instructions or warnings for inherently unsafe
products like pharmaceuticals. 49 As in the United States, consumers can re-
cover for personal injury, death, or harm to personal property.50 However,
the Directive does not provide for pain and suffering compensation, and
punitive damages do not play a role in European product liability.51
It should be remembered that Council Directives are only policy state-52
ments which supplement rather than replace existing national laws;5 Mem-
ber States are required to accept a Directive's stated policy goal, but the
means by which they enforce that policy goal fall within the province of53
each individual Member State. Thus, this product liability system leaves
room for differing national implementation of the same policy. s
C. The New Standard of Strict Liability in Japan
Unlike in the United States or the European Union, where formal
mechanisms such as Restatements and Directives provide direction for
shaping the future of product liability, "in Japan[;] informal, social forces
are molding this developing area of law, and the present and changinr law
cannot be understood without first understanding the social forces"5 that
have shaped Japanese law for centuries. Japanese law is a complex mixture
47 A producer can avoid liability by proving: (1) that he or she did not place the defective
product on the market; (2) that the defect probably did not exist at the time he or she did put
the product on the market; (3) that the product was not intended to be commercially distrib-
uted; (4) that based on the scientific and technological knowledge available at the time the
product was made and introduced to the market, it was impossible for the producer to know
or discover the defect. Directive, supra note 38, art. 7, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 31.48Id.
49Thieffry, supra note 33, at 234.50Directive, supra note 38, art. 9, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 31.
51 Thieffry, supra note 33, at 234.
52Treaty of Rome, art. 189. Directives bind Member States as to the result to be
achieved but leave up to each individual member state's domestic agencies the means of
achieving the end result. Id.531d.
5See infra Part II.D.55Shein-wold, supra note 37, at 275 (citing Hideo Tanaka, The Role of Law in Japanese
Society: Comparisons with the West, 19 U.B.C. L. REv. 375 (1985)).
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of tradition, civil law, and foreign influence. 6 In its earliest stages, the
Japanese legal system adopted Chinese legal traditions designed to central-
ize the emperor's authority. 7 The Chinese system, heavily influenced by
Confucianism, blended well with the hierarchical, feudal society ruled by
the Samurai warriors that flourished as the emperor's power diminished. 8
The combination of strict feudal hierarchy and Confucianism created a
Japanese tradition that stressed the importance of harmony 9 and group
obedience to superiors. The individual per se was unimportant; what mat-
tered was the group and the individual's position in the group hierarchy.60
The legal system encouraged conciliation and settlement since preservation
of the group, not individual rights was its focus. 61 Confucianism collided
with democracy when Commodore Matthew C. Perry, flanked by the
United States Navy, ended Japan's isolation from the Western world.62
Western powers superimposed elements of their legal systems over the ex-
isting Japanese legal framework.63
Although the legal framework currently reflects the influence of west-
er ideas,64 the legal reality reveals the retention of Japanese culture and
tradition. Lawyers and judges represent only a tiny fraction of the popula-
56Hideo Tanaka, The Role of Law in Japanese Society: Comparisons with the West, 19
U.B.C. L. REv. 375, 386 (1985).57Paul Lansing & Marlene Wechselblatt, Doing Business in Japan: The Importance Of
Unwritten Law, 17 INT'L LAWYER 647, 647 (1983). In addition, the adoption of Chinese le-
gal traditions sought to minimize the aristocracy's power and rationalize land ownership.
Sheinwold, supra note 37, at 275.58There were two distinct warrior-controlled periods. The Shogunate Era which lasted
from around 1300-1600s and the Tokugawa Shoginate Period (also know as the Edo Era)
which lasted from 1600-1850s, and although there were differences between the two, during
both periods, Japan remained a strict hierarchical, feudal society. See Mark A. Behrens &
Daniel H. Raddock, Japan's New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability
Falls, But Access to Recovery is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L.
669, 671-72 (1995) (discussing the historical origins and development of the Japanese legal
system).
59This is what the Japanese refer to as Wa, or understanding one's place in society and
accepting it. See id. at 672.60Lansing & Wechselblatt, supra note 57, at 648.61Elliott J, Hahn, An Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
517, 519 (1983).62Commodore Perry opened Japan to the West in 1853. See Behrens & Raddock, supra
note 58, at 672-673.63At first more subtle pressure forced Japan to westernize its legal system. For example,
in order to counteract several unfavorable treaties, Japan adopted principles of German civil
code. These pressures intensified after World War II, when the United States urged (or some
would argue forced) Japan to incorporate the ideals of individual rights and an adversarialjudiciary system (as opposed to judge-led inquisitions) in a new Constitution. See B.J.
George, Jr., The Japanese Judicial System: Thirty Years of Transition, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
807, 811 (1979).




tion in Japan,65 they are members of the small educational elite and are not
accessible to the average consumer.66 Moreover, there are no sympathetic
juries for consumers to appeal to, and discovery is extremely limited,67
making it difficult for consumers to prove exactly who the producer of a
particular product is and whether or not a product is defective. Until July
1995, product liability in Japan was governed by tort and contract laws
written in the nineteenth century.68 Product liability suits based in tort were
governed by a negligence standard predicated on the injured consumer's
ability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the manufacturer caused a
defect in the product and that such defect resulted in the consumer's in-
jury.69 Technically, claims could be made against producers for negligence
in manufacturing, inadequate warnings, and design defects. However, the
requirement of proving intent and negligence beyond a reasonable doubt,
combined with Japan's restrictive discovery limitations, made winning
anything but a straight manufacturing defect claim almost impossible.7 °
Although very restrictive, Japanese contract law provided some recov-
ery for damages caused by defective products.7' A producer had to deliver
a product that was fit for the purpose for which it was sold72 and did not
have any latent defects,73 or a consumer could recover damages for breach
of contract. However, the courts restricted recovery, imposing a judicial re-
quirement of proving negligence and limiting recovery to damages to the
product itself.
4
It was not until Japan faced a series of tragic incidents involving prod-
uct-related injuries that it began to move toward a more consumer-friendly
method of recovery in product liability cases. 75 After the Thalidomide inci-
65Tanaka, supra note 55, at 376.66Lansing & Wechselblatt, supra note 57, at 652-653.67Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 12, at 69.
65MrNPo (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan); SHOHO
(Commercial Code), Law No. 48 of 1899 (Japan).69MINPO, supra note 68, art. 709.70Id. A 1990 survey by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations showed that out of 250
instances in which attorneys were consulted about potential product liability cases, only
thirty claims were brought to court. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 58, at 680 n.61 (citing
Tadashi Saito, Product Liability Reform in Japan, 3A JAPAN ECON. INST. REP. 7 (1994)).71 Unlike the United States and the European Union, Japan strictly enforced a privity re-
quirement. See MrNPO, supra note 68, arts. 415, 570.72 1d. art. 415.
731d. art. 570.
74 Behrens & Raddock, supra note 58, at 683-84. If a seller can show that the defect was
caused by some factor which he or she could not control or foresee and that he or she took
reasonable measures to inspect and prevent defects, the seller is not held liable. Id. Moreo-
ver, a consumer cannot recover for personal injuries or damage caused to other property. Id.
7SId. at 686. For example, in the Marinaga Dairy case, 12,000 infants were poisoned by
powdered milk that had been contaminated with arsenic. See Younghee Jin Ottley & Bruce
L. Ottley, Product Liability Law in Japan: An Introduction to A Developing Area of Law, 14
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dent,76 the Japanese began researching better methods of addressing the
problem of defective products and injured consumers.77 However, it was
not until a new, more consumer-oriented government78 won power in 1993,
that Japan adopted its first product liability law. 79 Japan's new product li-
ability law, approved nine years after the European Union adopted its prod-
uct liability Directive, took effect in July 1995.
Japan's new product liability law embraces the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity, and the law's goal of protecting consumers by relieving them of the
burden of proving fault is a big step forward for Japanese consumers.
However, Japan's product liability law is short, vague, and some have la-
beled it a "watered-down" version of the United States and European Union
standards.8 0 Unlike the United States' standard that allows anyone in the
chain of distribution to be held strictly liable, Japan extends liability only to
the manufacturer of a product.81 Japan's new law, however, does utilize a
consumer expectation test similar to the test in the European Union for de-
termining if a product is defective. 82 The most noticeable difference be-
tween Japan's new law and the standards in the United States and the
European Union is that Japan's law does not specifically address how this
new strict liability standard will be applied to "unavoidably unsafe prod-
ucts" like pharmaceuticals.
Japanese consumers are limited in the damages they can claim. Con-
sumers in Japan cannot recover for pain and suffering 83 as they can in the
GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 29, 51 (1984). A number of deformed children were born who had
been exposed in utero to the drug Thalidomide which was used as a sleeping pill. See Louis
Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 1, at 334, 345.
76See supra Part III.B.3 for further discussion of the Thalidomide incident.77The Social Policy Council, a government advisory council on consumer issues, started
research on legislative solutions, while a group of lawyers and professors drafted an outline
for a new product liability law adopting the doctrine of strict liability. Behrens & Raddock,
supra note 58, at 686-87.78This new government, a seven-party coalition government including pro-consumer So-
cial Democratic and Komeito (Clean Government) parties, replaced Japan's previous con-
servative, pro-business party. See id. at 688.79Seizoubutsu Sekinin Ho [Liability Law], Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan) (hereinafter Li-
ability Law).
"
0See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 58, at 689.
81 Liability Law, supra note 79, art. 2(3). Manufacturer is defined in three ways: (1) Any
person who manufactures, processes or imports products as a business; (2) Any person who
by putting his name, trade name or trade mark on a product, either holds himself out as or
could be mistaken for the product's manufacturer; (3) Any other person who may be "recog-
nized as its manufacturer-in-fact" in light of the relevant circumstances. Id.
82 Japan's test: Generally, a product is defective if it lacks the safety it ordinarily should
have in light of the characteristics of the product itself and the ordinary use of the product.




United States and some European Union nations. However, Japanese con-
sumers can recover damages for death, personal injury, and property dam-
age. Moreover, in cases where a direct causal connection can be shown,
consumers can apparently recover for consequential economic losses such
as lost wages or profits suffered while the injured consumer was out of
work.
84
As with the Restatement and the Directive, Japan's new law provides a
"state of the art defense." This defense applies when, given the scientific
and technical knowledge available at the time a product was made and in-
troduced into market, the manufacturer could not have known or discovered
the defect.85 However, there is no indication of how this defense will be
applied.
Although the new law holds manufacturers liable for product-related
injuries regardless of fault, it contains few substantive provisions and leaves
key issues undefined and controversial questions unanswered.86 Questions
as to the scope of this law will have to be answered through judicial inter-
pretations on a case-by-case basis. 87 However, it may be some time before
these answers become available because Japan has a long tradition of non-
litigation. In the fifty years since World War H" ended, less than 150 prod-
uct liability cases have been decided in Japanese courts. 88 Moreover, judi-
cial interpretation will shape Japanese strict liability according to Japan's
unique culture and traditions. Unlike the United States or the European
Union, the concept of a natural hierarchy remains strong in Japan.89 The
recognition of this hierarchy and one's place in it promotes the Japanese
belief in harmony, and this desire for harmony creates a strong tradition of
not challenging one's superiors either in business or government.90 An in-
jured consumer who sues a manufacturer for product liability challenges not
only the product and its maker but the Japanese way of life.91
84 1d. This provision would go further than either the U.S. Restatement or the European
Directive, but again, we will have to wait and see how the Japanese courts interpret it.
8 Id. art. 4.
86Behrens & Raddock, supra note 58, at 689.87While Japan is a civil law country and does not rely as heavily on judicial precedent,
judicial interpretations, especially in an area of lav in which already few suits are brought, is
important. If courts interpret the law narrowly and make it difficult for plaintiffs to recover,
fewer plaintiffs will bother even to attempt to recover for injuries under the new law, and Ja-
pan's new standard of strict liability will essentially be meaningless.
88Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 12, at 49 n.23.
89d. at 62; Lansing & Wechselblatt, supra note 57, at 653.
90Bemstein & Fanning, supra note 12, at 52; Lansing & Wechselblatt, supra note 57, at
652; Tanaka, supra note 55, at 384-5.
91Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 12, at 52.
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D. The Same Standard?
Instituting a strict liability standard has not created uniformity in prod-
uct liability systems among the United States, the European Union, and Ja-
pan. While the form and goal of strict liability may appear the same, in
reality strict liability means different things under each regime. Each uses
its own history, culture, and legal traditions, to formulate and interpret its
own variation of strict liability.92 In the United States, it is not just thirty
years of strict liability that suggests individual consumers will find courts
sympathetic to their fight against large manufacturers, it is 200 years of
U.S. history predicated on pragmatic equality and individual empowerment.
The early American frontier provided enough land for all the new settlers;
therefore, unlike Europe and Japan, there was no need for feudalistic land-
based hierarchies. 93 Instead of land-based birth rights relegating people to
certain places in society, the law provided for equality and individual
rights.94 In this way, U.S. law became the great leveler.95
In the United States, law empowered the common person, mandating
that "all men were equal in the eyes of the law" and that "no man was above
the law. 96 As the champion of the common person, law helped individuals
assert their rights against those more powerful than themselves.97 These
principles lie at the heart of the legal system in the United States. It is this
mentality that provides the foundation for large jury awards in product li-
ability cases. Juries see an ordinary consumer battling to win justice against
a powerful manufacturer that appears to act as it were above the law. The
jury helps the common person by granting large compensatory damages and
shows the manufacturer that it is not above the law by awarding large puni-
tive damages. Regardless of the liability standard, the U.S. tradition of
"cheering for the underdog" will continue to encourage judges and juries to
find for individuals in their fights against large manufacturers in product li-
ability cases.
The multinational structure of the European Union and the individual-
istic nature of the implementation of Council Directives have a significant
impact on the application of the product liability standard that currently ex-
ists within the European Union. Each Member State has its own unique
traditions. The Directive itself cannot provide a cause of action for product
921d. at 68.
931d. at 59.94 See e.g., UNrrED STATES CoNsT. art. I § 9 (prohibiting the United States from granting
titles of nobility).95See Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 12, at 59. Law told people where they belonged
and what their rights were in the United States whereas in feudal societies, the land-based
aristocracy told people where their place was in society. Id.96 See id. See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these
truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal").97See Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 12, at 59.
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liability because European Union Directives are not self-executing.98 The
product liability Directive must be enacted through individual Member
State legislation.99 Moreover, since the Directive does not require uniform
compliance, even in those Member States where it has been enacted, sub-
stantive differences remain in several areas.100 For example, Member States
can decide whether to extend the definition of "product,"'1 1 allow the "state
of the art" defense, 10 2 cap damages for personal injury caused by the same
defect in identical products, 03 and choose whether compensation will be
allowed for pain and suffering. 104 Germany, for example, created a separate
provision governing pharmaceutical products that does not allow the "state
of the art" defense. 05 Greece narrowed the definition of "producer'' 106
while other states have broadened it to include suppliers or importers of a
product.10 7 Going even further, the United Kingdom inserted a negligence
standard into the "state of the art defense," which caused the European Un-
ion Commission to start proceedings against the United Kingdom for non-
compliance with the strict liability standard.0 8
Although in form the European Union and the United States have offi-
cially adopted strict liability as their product liability standard, the applica-
tion of strict liability varies widely between the two regimes. Jury trials, for
example, are favored by consumers in the United States because juries are
thought to be more sympathetic to consumers and give higher awards.
However, England is the only European Union member which uses jury tri-
98See Directive, supra note 38, art. 19, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 33 ("Member States shall
bring into force ... the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to comply
with this Directive").
99Treaty of Rome, art. 189; see also Directive, supra note 38, art. 19, 1985 O.J. (L 210)
at 33.
100See Directive, supra note 38, art. 15, 16, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 32 (explicitly granting
member states discretion to define 'product producer' and defenses to liability).
101 For example, Member States can include agricultural products in the definition of
"product." Id. art. 15(l), 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 32.
10 2 See id. art. 15(2), 1985 O.3. (L 210) at 32.
1°3Id. art. 16, 1985 O.J. (L 210) at 32.
104 HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNING, supra note 34, at 8-9.
105 See Law Concerning Liability for Defective Products of 15 December 1989, § 15 (re-
printed in English in HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNiNG, supra note 34, at 160).
106See Act No. 1961 of 3 September 1991 on Consumer Protection And Other Provisions
As Amended by Act No. 2000 of 27 December 1991, art. 8(1) (reprinted in English in
HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNING, supra note 34, at 165-66).
10 7 Id. at 39; see, e.g., Portugal's Decree Law No. 383/89 of 6 November 1989, art. 2 (re-
printed in English in HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNING, supra note 34, at 197.
108See United Kingdom's Consumer Protection Act 1987 (1987 Ch. 43) Part 1, § 4(1)(e)
(reprinted in HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNING, supra note 34, at 204). .While this section does not
explicitly mention a "reasonable person" standard, this negligence standard was employed
by lav makers to describe this provision. See HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNING, supra note 34, at
78 n. 4.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 18:685 (1998)
als. Moreover, because most Member States do not allow compensation for
pain and suffering,'0 9 the damage awards in the European Union remain
significantly lower than damage awards in the United States where pain and
suffering are compensable in a product liability suit.n1 Additionally, most
Member States have placed caps' on other compensatory damages, and
punitive damages are not allowed." 2 The United States and the European
Union both aim to compensate consumers without requiring a showing of
manufacturer fault. 1' 3 However, they use different philosophies, methods
and legal traditions to pursue that goal.
The Japanese goal of harmony negates the need for the law to serve as
the social equalizer and protector of individual rights as it does in the
United States and the European Union. Instead, Japanese citizens view the
law as an authority over them that will, if necessary, relieve genuine injury.
However, relief is not focused solely on monetary redress and punitive ac-
tion as it seems to be in the United States and the European Union." 4 Con-
ciliation is stressed. For example, a simple apology1 or an agreement to
establish safety guidelines for the future have been used as alternatives to
litigation.1 6 In fact, there is a general dislike of lawsuits and lawyers who
are seen to detract from social harmony."
7
Around the same time that Japan passed its new consumer-friendly
product liability law, governmental agencies asked members of the Japa-
nese business community to organize associations within their respective
industries to "deal with" product liability claims and settle them out of
court." 8 As a result, the Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' As-
sociation of Japan was created to help settle product liability claims in the
pharmaceutical industry out of court.' 9 Considering the unique culture and
109 See HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNING, supra note 34.
1l0 For a discussion of the more "positive environment" for product liability suits in
Europe, see Sheinwold, supra note 37, at 257-8.
111 Capping damages means limiting them to a certain maximum amount.
112 HOFFMAN & HILL-ARNNG, supra note 34, at 4.
n
3 Marshall Shapo, Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and American
Law, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 279, 282 (1993).
14Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 12, at 70. Conciliation procedures are an important
consideration as well. See Tanaka, supra note 55, at 384-85.
15 Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law & Culture in
Japan and the United States, 20 L. & Soc'y. REv. 461,469 (1986).
"
6Bemstein & Fanning, supra note 12, at 65 (citing NoRiE HUDDLE ET AL., ISLAND OF
DREAMS: ENVIRONMENTAL CRisis IN JAPAN 177 (1975)).
11 Lansing & Wechselblatt, supra note 57, at 653.
"'Product Liability Mediators, YOMIURI SHIMBN [THE DAILY YOMIuR], Mar. 30, 1995,
at 9, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Yomiuri File; Committee Due to Handle Drug
Complaints Under PL Law, COMLINE Daily News Biotech & Medical Tech., May 18,




legal traditions in Japan, the application and scope of strict liability could
take a different direction in Japan than the strict liability standard in either
the United States or the European Union. However, the pharmaceutical in-
dustry will have to wait to see what that direction will be because Japan's
product liability law is so new.
There is little certainty provided by a uniform standard applied non-
uniformly. The only thing certain about product liability among the United
States, the European Union, and Japan is that it is uncertain. Product liabil-
ity standards and applications of those standards are always changing;
sometimes these changes are subtle,120 and sometimes they are quite radi-
cal.' 2 ' Although recent radical changes in product liability standards in Ja-
pan have seemingly created a uniform standard of strict liability among the
major players in the pharmaceutical market, subtle differences in the con-
struction, interpretation, and application of that standard pull them worlds
apart.
These three regimes use their individual beliefs and traditions to form
their own conception of strict liability and determine how that standard will
translate into consumer recovery. No matter what the standard is, however,
there will never be uniformity in consumer recovery if each regime indi-
vidually decides how to apply and enforce that liability standard, and inter-
pretations will always vary. Thus, as long as pharmaceutical product
liability cases continue to be decided domestically, uncertainty will always
remain, and it is that inevitable inconsistency and uncertainty which creates
problems in the international pharmaceutical market.
I. PROBLEMS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET CAUSED BY
UNCERTAINTY IN PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. The Economics of Uncertainty
Product liability law has undoubtedly had some beneficial effects on
the safety of certain pharmaceutical products. It helped eliminate the harm-
ful intrauterine contraceptive, the Dalkon Shield, 122 from the market, and
more recently it helped foster the removal of the weight loss drug, Phen
12°For example, judicial interpretations regarding "unavoidably unsafe" products in the
United States. See supra Part II. A.
121 For example, Japan changing from contract and tort liability to a strict liability stan-
dard codified in its new product liability law. See supra Part II. C.
t22Liability exposure forced A.H. Robbins Company to remove its intrauterine contra-
ceptive device, the Dalkon Shield, from the market after research demonstrated that it in-
creased a woman's chance of developing pelvic inflammatory disease and caused sterility.
Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May be Hazardous to Your Health: A
No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM.U. L. REv. 199,208 (1992).
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Phen, from the market.123  However, when consumer compensation and
protection is replaced by punishment, liability exposure often hinders rather
than helps pharmaceutical safety as manufacturers discontinue products and
halt research. International pharmaceutical companies sell their products
world- wide; thus, they have no way of knowing where a consumer injury
will occur and therefore, no way of foreseeing the forum in which they will
face prosecution. Even though the three major players in the international
pharmaceutical market, the United States, the European Union and Japan,
have all formally adopted the doctrine of strict liability for product-related
injury suits, how that standard will be interpreted and applied and what
damages will be allowed within these different fora remain uncertain.
124
Uncertainty breeds fear, and in the pharmaceutical market, the uncertainty
surrounding product liability cases has bred a fear of devastating liability.
This fear has had serious ramifications on the pharmaceutical market.
Basic economics and simple common sense explain why this uncer-
tainty and fear negatively effect the international pharmaceutical market.
As Judge Richard Posner 125 points out, individuals make determinations of
whether to engage in an activity by deciding if participating in that activity
is worth paying the price that participation requires, or if avoiding the ac-
tivity, and thus, the expense is a better option. Judge Posner also points
out that there are other factors that contribute to an individual's decision-
making process such as concern for the well-being or wishes of others.2 7
However, considering that the individuals in this case are pharmaceutical
companies engaged in making and marketing a product for a profit, it seems
plausible, if not likely, that economic and cost considerations will be para-
mount in companies' decisions to produce and sell their products. For any
activity, there are certain factors that will affect the activity's price; there-
fore, accurate information on those factors is essential in determining the
12 3 Research has linked the use of Phen Phen to heart valve problems. See Dana Canedy,
H.MO. 's Move To Restrict Use Of Diet Pills By Members, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at
D5. The FDA recently revoked its approval of this drug. See Sheryl G. Stolberg, F.D.A.
Warns About Herbs For Weight Loss, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1997, at Al.
124Uncertainity is exacerbated by the fact that an injured consumer can usually file suit in
either the jurisdiction where the injury occurred or the jurisdiction where the manufacturer is
located; this can lead to "forum shopping" where a consumer will file suit where it will be
best for him or her in terms of relief or expense. Lasagna, supra note 75, at 337.
125Richard Posner is a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit and is regarded as one of the United States' most eminent scholars on economic legal
theory. Judge Posner has been criticized for applying his economic theory selectively, in fa-
vor of conservatism, and for failing to recognize the limits of economic theory when con-
fronted with real markets that may prove inefficient or incomplete. See e.g., George M.
Cohen, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View From the Bench,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 1117 (1985).





actual price of an activity.1 28 Among other things, when determining what
the price of manufacturing a product for the international market will be,
pharmaceutical companies will need to look at the cost of making the prod-
uct, the liability risks associated with that product, and the costs of covering
those liability risks. Uncertainty in liability risks and the costs of covering
those risks makes it difficult for pharmaceutical companies to make accu-
rate calculations about the costs of manufacturing and marketing a drug.
Common sense suggests that corporations weigh the consequences of
their actions before making decisions.229 The reality in the pharmaceutical
market is that, with no way to accurately anticipate a product's liability
risks, and with the only weighable consequence being the potential for ex-
tremely large liability exposure, the safest course of action for pharmaceuti-
cal companies is to keep a product off the market or increase prices to such
a level that pharmaceutical companies can cover the costs that result from
uncertain liability risks. This reality has created distortions in the interna-
tional pharmaceutical market, increased both manufacturing and consumer
costs, and chilled research and development of new pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. The best way to illustrate the negative effects that uncertain liability
has on the pharmaceutical market is by example. This part of the comment
will primarily use examples from the pharmaceutical market where the ef-
fects of liability fears speak for themselves. These examples are not used to
suggest that all drugs are potential horror stories waiting to occur. Many
drugs are manufactured and marketed without incident. These examples are
used merely as concrete illustrations of the real problems that uncertain
product liability exposure has created in the pharmaceutical market.
B. Distortions in the Market
In an industry in which the costs of bringing a drug to the market are
rapidly increasing, the fear of unknown and potentially devastating liability
has caused pharmaceutical companies to stop manufacturing and marketing
certain products. This coerced halt in production creates three negative
consequences. First, the loss of a product means certain maladies will go
untreated. Second, a reduction in the number of manufacturers producing a
product can create shortages and pose serious health risks. Third, the fear
that initiated the halt in manufacturing creates a stigma that remains long
after the immediate danger has passed and binds the actions of pharmaceu-
tical companies long into the future.
128id.
129For example, -when deciding how to cut costs, corporations routinely consider the ef-
fects that laying off workers will have on their public image and their profits or, when plan-
ning a merger, corporations consider how the announcement of the merger will affect the
price of their stock.
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1. Bendectin Example
In 1956, the William S. Merrell Company (hereinafter Merrell Co.) in-
troduced a drug called Bendectin that relieved the nausea and vomiting as-
sociated with pregnancy.130  It remains the only drug to ever receive
approval to be marketed in the United States for the treatment of "morning
sickness". 131 Bendectin initially enjoyed huge success and was sold in
twenty-two countries and prescribed to twenty-five percent of the pregnant
women in the United States.132 However, in 1969, a mother filed the first
lawsuit claiming Bendectin caused birth defects. 33 In this case, as in the
many suits that followed, the claim for relief was based on the argument
that the mother had used Bendectin during her pregnancy and had given
birth to a deformed baby; therefore, Bendectin must have caused the de-
fect. 13
4
If Bendectin did cause birth defects, then even if the manufacturer did
not know such a result would occur, a fair liability system would compen-
sate injured consumers and promote the product's removal from the market
to ensure future consumer safety. However, the evidence shows that Ben-
dectin did not cause birth defects. Numerous studies 135 were conducted to
determine if Bendectin was in fact a teratogen 36 A study by Robert Brent
reflects the conclusion revealed in the vast majority of studies. As Brent's
study points out, birth defects occur in one to seven percent of all infants
even when a teratogen is not present. 37 Based on the fact that around thirty
million infants were exposed in utero to Bendectin, Brent concluded that
with a birth defect rate of three percent, chance alone and not Bendectin
could account for 900,000 birth defects among the exposed infants.'38
Moreover, no study ever proved that Bendectin was a teratogen, and both
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the majority of courts con-
130 Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 317 (1992).
131 Jackson, supra note 122, at 207.
132 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 338.
133See Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Lab., 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983) (mother claimed
that her son's birth defect was caused by Bendectin which she had taken during her preg-
nancy).
134See id; Lasagna, supra note 75, at 338. As is the case with any birth defect, the par-
ents wanted to know why this happened. The Mekdecis chose Bendectin as the cause even
though an investigation revealed that Bendectin was only one of seven medications Mrs.
Mekdeci took during her pregnancy. MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS ToXIc SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 2 (1996).
135Sanders, supra note 130, at 395 (table of Bendectin Epidemiological studies).
136A teratogen is an agent that causes medical defects. Lasagna, supra note 75, at 338.





cluded that there was no increased risks of birth defects associated with
Bendectin. 1
39
The FDA never asked for the removal of Bendectin; Merrell Co. had
followed the FDA regulations, passed the necessary research tests, and sat-
isfied the scientific experts. In fact, a 1980 FDA hearing on the safety of
Bendectin largely exonerated the drug.140  So why has Bendectin disap-
peared from the market? Two words provide the answer-product liability.
Despite the overwhelming evidence that showed Bendectin was not a tera-
togen,141 parents of children with birth defects who were searching for an-
swers as to why the defects occurred were spurred on by the media storm
generated by plaintiffs' lawyers.1 42 These lawyers, armed with a few stud-
ies that supported only the possibility that Bendectin could be a teratogen
continued to fuel the litigation fires. 143 In 1983, Merrell Co. faced a seem-
ingly endless barrage of liability suits and an unfavorable ratio between
Bendectin's profits on sales and the cost of fighting these liability suits.
144
Thus, Merrell Co. voluntarily removed Bendectin from the market not be-
cause of any danger it posed to consumers but because of the financial dan-
ger the company faced from liability exposure. At a 1983 press conference
announcing the removal of Bendectin from the market, Merrell Co.'s Presi-
dent made it clear that Bendectin's "removal was a result of business, rather
than medical, concerns.' 45  At the same press conference, Dr. Charles
Flowers, Vice President of the American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists, commented that the loss of Bendectin would create a "signifi-
cant therapeutic gap. 146 The removal of Bendectin means that "morning
sickness" remains untreated for thousands of women in the United States.
139 See e.g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1350 (6th Cir.
1992) cert. denied 506 U.S. 826 (1992) (finding insufficient evidence to conclude Bendectin
caused plaintiff's birth defect); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F.Supp. 799,
803 (D.D.C. 1986) (citing and following independent FDA advisory panel finding nothing to
implicate Bendectin exposure as cause of increased incidence of birth defects), aff'd, 857
F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell Nat'l Lab.,
646 F.Supp. 856, 867 (D. Mass. 1986) (concluding that plaintiffs evidence was insufficient
to support conclusion that Bendectin caused her birth defect) affd, 830 F.2d 1190 (Ist Cir.
1987).
140 GREEN, supra note 134, at 159.
141 None of the 39 epidemiological studies conducted clearly concluded Bendectin was a
teratogen, and although six of the studies indicated at least one significant correlation be-
tween Bendectin and some adverse affect, the other 33 studies found no such statistical rela-
tionship. See Sanders, supra note 130, at 395.
142 GREEN, supra note 134, at 159. The proliferation of litigation was a product of law-
yers who used national media to capitalize on the possibility of an explosion of suits involv-
ing Bendectin. Id.
143 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 338.
'44 See id.
145 GREEN, supra note 134, at 180.1461id.
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2. Vaccine Example
Vaccination is the world's preventative method of fighting disease.
Vaccines have arguably one of the highest social values of any pharmaceu-
tical product since they do not just respond to pain or sickness but actually
prevent disease. Vaccines are responsible for the complete elimination of
small pox from the planet and the near disappearance of polio, measles, ru-
bella, mumps, diphtheria, and tetanus from countries like the United States
that have standard immunizations. 147 However, overwhelming product li-
ability concerns have caused many pharmaceutical companies to stop
manufacturing vaccines.
Even in a perfect market, vaccines do not provide much of a profit
when balanced against the large investment required for their production. 148
Vaccine production is very complex. Manufacturing one vaccine can take
six to twelve months. In addition, because vaccine production requires spe-
cial facilities, companies cannot use these facilities to manufacture other
products. 149 Moreover, the market for vaccines is often unpredictable. For-
eign markets are unpredictable because different countries have different
rules and requirements regarding distribution, marketing and suppliers.' 50
Developing countries, which could provide the largest market because they
have the greatest need for vaccination, are often unable to pay for the neces-
sary vaccines.151 Finally, if a vaccine works properly, then the disease it
attacks will be eliminated, and the market will disappear.15 2 For many
companies, adding the burden of uncertain, potentially large liability ex-
penses to the list of profit killers already facing vaccine manufacturers has
raised the risks too much to merit the expense of making vaccines.
A liability system should protect consumers and provide them with
compensation for actual injuries, but it should not unfairly punish produc-
ers. Although the volume of suits for vaccination-related injuries remains
relatively low when compared to other drug-related injury suits, the dam-
ages sought in these cases far exceed the profits available to cover liability
awards.' For example, the amount of damages claimed in lawsuits filed
against manufacturers of the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine
147 See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
166 (1988).
148 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 341.
1491d. at 341-342. These two realities often create inventory and cash flow problems for
vaccine manufacturers. Id.
'
5 Id. at 342.
151id.
'
52H. William Smith III, Note, Vaccinating AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers Against Prod-
uct Liability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 207, 238 (1992) (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 34 (1985)).
153See Jackson, supra note 122, at 205.
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was more than double the gross annual sales of the vaccine. 154 In the 1980s,
a manufacturer of a whooping cough vaccine was named the defendant in a
new suit each week. 55 The manufacturer faced $2 billion in damages
awards, with the punitive damages alone totaling 200 times the annual
revenue derived from the vaccine.
5 6
These huge potential liability awards make liability insurance essential,
but at the same time make insurers wary of providing coverage and often
raise insurance premiums out of the economic reach of most manufacturers.
For example, in 1976, fear of a swine flu epidemic prompted the U.S. Con-
gress to launch an emergency vaccination program. 5 7  Pharmaceutical
companies quickly developed a vaccine, but the insurance companies re-
fused to provide coverage fearing large liability. 5 8 The vaccine manufac-
turers, also realizing the potential devastating affect of projected liability
costs, refused to sell the vaccines without insurance.15 9 Only when Con-
gress agreed to insure pharmaceutical companies against liability did the
vaccination process proceed.1 60  More recently, the Center for Disease
Control (CDC), the sole distributor of the vaccine for Japanese encephali-
tis,1 6 1 announced that the vaccine would no longer be available because the
manufacturer did not have appropriate liability insurance, and there was no
mechanism to absolve the manufacturer from liability in case of injury. 162
The losers in these conflicts are the consumers who lose access to valuable
vaccines.
As vaccine manufacturers decide that the benefits of producing vac-
cines do not outweigh the risks, the number of vaccine manufacturers de-
creases. Today, only a single supplier remains for many vaccines. 6' This
modem trend toward monomanufacturers not only distorts the market, but
also poses a threat to consumers. 64 The price of vaccines may rise to such
a level that not everyone will be able to afford these lifesaving products.
Moreover, anytime a product has only one supplier, the danger of shortages
arises. In the case of pharmaceutical products, a shortage can create serious
154 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 342.
155 HUBER, supra note 147, at 166-67.
1561d.
157 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, A NATION OF GUINEA PIGS 54 (1979).
15 8HUBER, supra note 147, at 133.
1591d. at 133-34.
'6Oid.
161Encephelitis is a mosquito-born viral infection.
162 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 343.
163There used to be three to six manufacturers producing vaccines for measles, mumps,
rubella, and polio, but as of 1986 these vaccines each have only one producer. See H.R.
Rep. No. 99-908, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6348.
'64Id. at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345 (noting that decline in number of
vaccine manufacturers has caused decline of immunization against some preventable dis-
eases coupled with increase of disease).
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public health risks. For example, in 1984, liability concerns caused Wyeth
and Connaught Laboratories to stop selling the DTP vaccine to the public,
making Lederle Lab the sole manufacturer of this vaccine in the United
States. 65 When Lederle had production problems, concerns over a shortage
of DTP vaccine caused the CDC to recommend that people stop vaccinating
children over the age of one so that vaccine supplies could be saved for
more vulnerable infants.166 The shortage proved to be less serious than
originally thought, but the reality for dangerous shortages in the future is
clear.167
3. Thalidomide Example
Perhaps the most infamous drug in the history of pharmaceutical prod-
uct liability is Thalidomide. This sedative-hypnotic drug, introduced by the
West German manufacturer, Chemie Grunenthal, in 1957, quickly became
the most popular sleeping pill in West Germany.168 Eventually, fourteen
different pharmaceutical companies were producing Thalidomide and sell-
ing it under different trade names in over forty-five different countries. 169
However, after a 1961 report by German and Australian doctors associated
Thalidomide with certain birth defects,1 70 the drug disappeared from almost
every world market.171 Liability concerns undoubtedly played a role in the
disappearance of Thalidomide, and those liability fears continue to affect
the pharmaceutical market today.1 72
Doctors continued to research the drug, and have discovered that Tha-
lidonide has many significant, beneficial medical uses.173 It has unique
anti-inflammatory and immunosuppressant properties that make it effective
in treating many painful and debilitating medical conditions including: lep-
165 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 343.
'6Id. at 344.
167id"
168 Sanders, supra note 130, at 313; GREEN, supra note 134, at 64.
169 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 344.
170 Sanders, supra note 130, at 313.
171 GREEN, supra note 134, at 72.
172This comment does not mean to suggest that a drug that causes medical defects should
remain on the market simply to stabilize the pharmaceutical industry. Harmful products
should be removed. However, drugs that are on the market have usually undergone years of
extensive testing. See 21 U.S.C. §355(b) 1994 (requiring extensive testing of pharmaceutical
products before their approval by the FDA). Thus, these products should be presumed to be
safe and allowed to remain on the market unless there is substantial evidence that the drug is
in fact harmful.
173 See Tinker Ready, Sullied Drug Endorsed: Thalidomide Found to Ease AIDS Sores,
NEws & OBSERVER, May 22, 1997, at Al; Sally Squires, The Other Side of Thalidomide: A
Sedative That Caused Birth Defects Abroad Is Tried In Arthritis Transplant Cases, WASH.
POST, June 20, 1989, at 9.
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rosy, discoid lupus, and rheumatoid arthritis.174 Researchers have also dis-
covered that Thalidomide may prove invaluable in fighting AIDS.175 Until
recently, researchers and manufacturers made no attempt to reintroduce
Thalidomide into the general market, but instead sold directly to physicians
and health clinics who routinely used Thalidomide to treat these and other
recurring medical conditions. 7 In 1985, Chemie Grunenthal, stopped all
production and distribution of Thalidomide due to liability concerns.
1 77
Since 1985, only one small Brazilian pharmaceutical manufacturer has con-
tinued to produce Thalidomide.1 71 It has been difficult for physicians and
health clinics to obtain this valuable drug and there is uncertainty about fu-
ture supplies.1 79 As with Bendectin, the public continues to think of Tha-
lidomide as one of the "most notorious drug[s] in history. s18 0  Few
companies are willing to face the liability exposure that manufacturing such
a drug would involve 81
The "side effects" of liability fears created by Thalidomide reach much
further than one product. Thirty years later, the liability fears generated by
Thalidomide have resulted in the pharmaceutical industry rejecting pregnant
women as consumers.1 82  Most pharmaceutical companies issue blanket
warnings against pregnant women using their products. While sometimes
these warnings are merited,183 in many cases there is no documented reason
174 Squires, supra note 173.
See Lawrence K. Altman, Researchers Testing Thalidomide For Use In Aids, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 1, 1993, at Al.
176Lasagna, supra note 75, at 346-47. Doctors at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill have conducted research on the affects of Thalidomide in helping cure ulcers
related to AIDS. Their initial research showed 55% of those taking Thalidomide to treat
those ulcers were healed completely. See Ready, supra note 173.
'nLasagna, supra note 75, at 346.
781 Id. at 347.
179Id.
18OSee Ready, supra note 173.
181 Thirty-five years after Thalidomide was removed from the world market, one com-
pany has obtained a patent and plans to market the drug under the name Silced as a treatment
for leprosy See Sheryl G. Stolberg, 37 Years Later, A Second Chance For Thalidomide, N.Y.
TaIEs, Sept. 23, 1997, at 6.
182See Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 20, 1996) (interview with obstetri-
cian, Dr, Laura Riley, discussing what drugs pregnant women should and should not take);
see also HUBER, supra note 147, at 155. As one pharmaceutical company executive put it,
"Who in their right mind would work on a product today that would be used by pregnant
women?" See id.
83 For example, Accutane is a drug used to treat severe cystic acne, but animal research
showed it to be teratogenic in animals; therefore, it was marketed with the warning that
women should not use it any time before or during pregnancy. Jackson, supra note 122, at
208-09. The fear of liability is so high that Hoffman La Roche, Accutane's manufacturer,
added a pregnancy prevention kit to its product that included an instructional video tape and
informed consent forms. Id. Similarly, officials at the FDA announced they would only ap-
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to restrict a product from use by pregnant women. Manufacturers are sim-
ply frightened by the possibility of liability suits involving birth defects in
light of the Thalidomide and Bendectin incidents. Little to no research has
been done to determine what, if any, effects these drugs will have on preg-
nancy and the birth of a child.184 These warnings and restrictions are more
a way of limiting liability exposure since, by restricting the product to non-
pregnant women, companies can avoid birth defect claims and the devas-
tating stigma associated with claims like those in the Thalidomide and Ben-
dectin cases.
C. Increased Costs
Some pharmaceutical products remain on the market despite large li-
ability exposure; however, the uncertainty of product liability increases the
costs of both manufacturing and purchasing these products. The cost of in-
troducing a new drug to the market has sky-rocketed in the last ten years.
In the United States, bringing a new drug to the market takes an average of
twelve years and costs over $230 million.18 Moreover, for every 10,000
drugs tested, only one will be approved by the FDA and introduced to the
market. I8 6 The situation in the European Union is no better as it may take
as long as fourteen years, at similar costs, to develop a new drug.'8 7 While
manufacturers can estimate the costs of developing a product, they cannot
predict liability expenses. Pharmaceutical companies now spend millions
of dollars researching, developing, and testing new products in the hopes of
avoiding liability exposure.' 8 This amount pales in comparison, however,
to the rising litigation expenses pharmaceutical companies incur in fighting
multi-million dollar lawsuits and paying explosive jury awards and out-of-
court settlements. 8 9 Companies not only have to pay liability awards but
also have to incur expenses for in-house counsel and outside trial attorneys.
They then have to expend more money on marketing and advertising'9 to
counteract the negative publicity generated by liability suits.' 9'
prove Thalidomide to treat leprosy if the drug contained "elaborate restrictions" to keep it
away from pregnant women. Stolberg, supra note 123.
'84Jackson, supra note 122, at 208-09.
'
85Kanusky, supra note 9, at 682-83.186Jackson, supra note 122, at 230-31.
117 To Provide Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 524
(Apr. 11, 1990).
88 Jackson, supra note 122, at 230-3 1.
18 9See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991), reh'g denied (plaintiff
filed a $21 million lawsuit against the manufacturer of Halcion and eventually received a
multi-million dollar settlement).
190A 1991 Senate staff report revealed that pharmaceutical manufacturers spend billions
on marketing and advertising and that, in fact, they spend more on marketing and advertising
than on research. STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 102D CONG. IST SEss., THE
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Moreover, to protect against potentially devastating liability awards,
pharmaceutical companies must purchase liability insurance at premiums
that have sky-rocketed in recent years. Insurance premiums have increased
because it is difficult-almost impossible-to calculate the quantifiable
risks associated with pharmaceutical production in today's litigation and li-
ability climate.192 Thus, to insure against these incalcuable risks, insurers
will charge disproportionately high premiums. 193 Further, pharmaceutical
manufacturers who need capital to help finance the production of new, in-
novative products may face serious credit concerns. As with insurance
companies, uncertainty makes creditors nervous, so they will charge higher
interest rates to protect against their own losses. 194 All of these concerns
will increase the cost manufacturers must expend to bring products to the
market.
As the costs of manufacturing a product increase, manufacturers must
either decide to stop making a product, as with Bendectin, 95 or must spread
their costs across the market by increasing the-product's price, as with vac-
cines,196 or accept a lower profit margin. Thus, as liability expenses raise
manufacturing costs, drug prices are rising at alarming rates. A Senate re-
port revealed that during the first six months of 1991, the general yearly
rate of inflation was 3.3% while the annual inflation rate of prescription
drugs was 11.2% .
DRUG MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY: A PREscRIPTIoN FOR PROFITS 28-29 (Comm. Print 1991)
[hereinafter A PRESCnRIPTION FOR PROFITS].
191 The experience of Chemie Gruenthal, the West German manufacturer of Thalidomide,
presents a good example of the many ways in which product liability affects a company's
costs. This example is not intended to imply that the costs incurred by Gruenthal were un-
warranted or that the victims of Thalidomide were unfairly compensated. It is merely one of
the best-documented examples of the interplay between product liability and cost. First, the
removal of Thalidomide from the market hit Gruenthal hard because, at the time of its re-
moval, Thalidomide represented 50% of Gruenthal's sales. GREEN, supra note 134, at 65.
Second, after three years of highly publicized litigation in Germany, Gruenthal agreed to
settle for $30 million to be paid directly by the company, and another $20 million to be paid
by the German government. Id. at 74. This $50 million represented only the damages paid
in Germany. More damages would be sought and won by consumers in England and later in
the United States. Id. at 75. Finally, there is no way to measure the financial losses stem-
ming from the bad publicity of having the company's name associated with one of the most
notorious drags in history.
192Christoph Ann, Innovations in the Crossfire: A Policy Sketch for Unknowable Risks in
European and United States Liability Law, 10 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 173, 183 (1995).
193Id. Sometimes the risks are so high, that an insurer may refuse to provide coverage at
all. Id. For example, insurers refused to provide coverage for the new swine flu vaccine,
even when Congress had requested mass production and distribution of this vaccine. See"
HUBER, supra note 147, at 133.
194Ann, supra note 192, at 184.
195 See supra Part III.B.l.
196See supra Part II.B.2.
'
97 5ee A PRESCRIPTION FOR PROFITS, supra note 190, at 28-29.
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1. Halcion Example
An examination of recent events involving the drug Halcion illustrates
the many ways that increased liability fear has increased costs. Halcion, the
trade name for the drug triazolam, is a prescription sedative and is the most
widely-used drug for treating insomnia in the world. 98 In the late 1980s, a
young woman filed a $21 million lawsuit against I-alcion's manufacturer,
the Upjohn Company. 99 The plaintiff, who shot and killed her eighty-three
year old mother, claimed that she had acted while in a Halcion-induced in-
toxication that caused depression, psychosis, depersonalization, aggressive
assaultive behavior, and homicidal compulsions.' °° Despite the fact that the
Supreme Court of Utah has found that FDA-approved prescription drugs
like Halcion are "unavoidably unsafe" products and are exempted from
strict liability, Upjohn feared that a jury would award damages anyway.
Thus, despite having "unavoidably unsafe" liability protection, Upjohn
chose to make an out-of-court multi-million dollar settlement rather than
face the risk of an even higher jury award.2°'
As Upjohn's costs increase as a result of fighting the suit and paying
the settlement award, so will Upjohn's prices. 202 However, there are other
less obvious costs as well. As a result of this case, the United Kingdom re-
moved Halcion from its market.20 3 This reaction reduced market exposure
that will translate into lost profit for Upjohn, which will likely compensate
for that loss by increasing the price of the drug in the remaining markets.2°
Moreover, the negative publicity created by this case and the removal of
Halcion from the British market will likely force Upjohn to increase its
marketing and advertising expenditures, again adding to the cost of the
product and likely resulting in a price increase. Finally, consumers in the
United Kingdom will have to spend more money to get the product from
other markets as it is no longer readily available to them. The reality is that
Halcion is widely-used and relied upon by consumers,205 thus, it is unlikely
that Upjohn will stop producing it.206 It is more likely that Upjohn will
198 Jackson, supra note 122, at 201.
9 Grundberg, supra note 189.
200Id. at 90.
201 Jackson, supra note 122, at 200.
212See generally POSNER, supra note 126.2031d. at 201.
2 4Ann, supra note 192, at 181.205 See Jackson, supra note 122, at 201.
2
°rSee generally POSNER, supra note 126. Having weighed the costs and benefits of par-
ticipating in the activity of selling Halcion and deciding to continue, Upjohn will then look
to maximize its profits which means raising prices to balance out rising costs. See Ann, su-
pra note 192, at 180-81.
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continue to produce and sell Halcion and will pass its increased costs on to
the consumer by raising prices so as to maintain its profit margin.20 7
2. Vaccine Example
In addition to the detrimental effect uncertain liability has had on the
availability of vaccines, increased litigation costs have raised the price of
certain vaccines. °8 These increased costs are attributable to higher premi-
ums paid by manufacturers for liability insurance and, in some cases, excise
taxes imposed on manufacturers for each dose of vaccine administered.2 9
For example, the DTP vaccine, recently a favorite target for liability claims,
cost only eleven cents in 1982, but four years and several liability suits
later, the price of DTP exploded to $11.40 with eight dollars of that price
going to pay for liability insurance.2 10
Another factor in the increased price of DTP and other childhood vac-
cines is the tax imposed per dose on manufacturers of these vaccines. 11
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act2 12 imposes a tax on certain
childhood vaccines.2 13 This tax helps finance a trust fund which compen-
sates children injured by certain vaccines without forcing them to resort to214
common law adjudication. The DTP vaccine has a $4.56 tax per dose
while the tax for the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine is $4.44 per dose; for
polio, twenty-nine cents per dose, and for diphtheria-tetanus six cents per
dose.215 The tax is based on a calculation of the estimated risk of each vac-
cine. In some cases manufacturers pass on the entire cost to consumers by
raising prices.2 16
207See for example the case of the DTP vaccine infra Part III.C.2.
208 See Gina Kolata, Litigation Causes Huge Price Increases in Childhood Vaccines, 232
SCIENCE 1339 (1986).
209 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 343-44; Jackson, supra note 122, at 205.
210 Jackson, supra note 122, at 237 n. 38 (citing Kolata, supra note 208).
211 Lasagna, supra note 75, at 344. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act imposes
a tax on certain childhood vaccines to pay for a trust that compensates consumers for injuries
caused by certain vaccines. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1994).
21242 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (1994).
213 The vaccines covered by the Act include: diptheria and tetanus toxoids (DT); measles,
mumps, and rubella (MMR); diptheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP); polio; and any combi-
nation thereof. 26 U.S.C. § 4132 (1994).
214 Jackson, supra note 122, at 224. The author notes that this fund, while providing vic-
tims with a more certain and efficient source of relief than tort action, also serves to pre-
empt such action, as the Act contains an award cap, and victims must exhaust all remedies
under the Act before they can bring any action in tort. Id.
215Lasagna, supra note 75, at 344.
216 Id"
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D. Chilling Research and Development
The costs of bringing a new product to the market are significant in
terms of both time and money. It can take up fourteen years to receive the
necessary regulatory approval to market a product in a particular country.2 17
During this time, a pharmaceutical company expends a great deal of money
and resources to research, develop, and test a new product. Pharmaceutical
companies must balance the costs of bringing a new product to the market
with the potential profits that a new drug will generate.218 Companies can
estimate potential profits by calculating the importance of a drug to society,
the size of the market for that drug, and the availability of other drugs with
similar effects.219 These potential profits must be weighed against not only
manufacturing costs, but also regulatory fees, liability insurance costs, liti-
gation expenses, and liability payments. Although companies can estimate
regulatory costs, uncertainty in product liability today makes it impossible
to accurately predict the liability costs. 220 With the increasing exposure to
potentially devastating liability, many pharmaceutical companies have de-
cided that researching and developing new products is not worth the risk.
1. Drugs and Pregnancy
Concerns over liability exposure have inhibited research into develop-
ing new contraceptives.221 In the early days of contraceptive research, as
pharmaceutical companies and medical researchers struggled to find better
methods of birth control, product liability played a valuable role in protect-
ing consumers. In the case of the birth control pill, many women took the222
pill without adequate information and warnings. Liability pressures en-
couraged further research into the drug, resulting in health officials urging a
lowering of estrogen levels and an increase in warnings about the pill's side223
effects. Liability exposure also helped remove the Dalkon Shield from
217Kanusky, supra note 9, at 683.218POSNER, supra note 126, at 274. For example, in light of the potential liability associ-
ated with vaccines, many manufacturers have been reluctant to invest their time and effort in
developing an AIDs vaccine. Smith, supra note 152, at 207.219Lasagna, supra note 75, at 336-37.
220 1d. at 337.
221 Jackson, supra note 122, at 204. The chilling effect product liability concerns have on
contraceptive research is illustrated by the fact that, in the United States, once a leader in
contraceptive research, as liability awards sky-rocketed, research expenditures for contra-
ceptives decreased 90% between 1973 and 1983. See HUBER, supra note 147, at 155.222 SHAPO, supra note 157, at 88-141. Professor Shapo makes the argument that women
were in essence being used as guinea pigs to test the harmful effects of the pill because they
were allowed and even encouraged to use the product to confirm the reports of negative side
effects of the drug. Id.223Id. In 1969, the Chairman of the British Committee on Safety of Drugs spoke out to
encourage women not to take contraceptive pills containing estrogen levels higher than fifty
micrograms. See id. at 108. The FDA followed suit by sending recommendations to physi-
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the market,224 after research demonstrated that this intrauterine contracep-
tive device increased pelvic inflammatory disease and caused sterility.25
Liability expenses, including approximately $3 billion in damage awards
forced A.H. Robbins to remove this unsafe product from the market and de-
clare bankruptcy.
226
However, the protection that liability exposure has provided to con-
sumers has become harmful in some ways. For example, some scholars
have suggested that the chilling effect of potential liability on the oral con-
traceptive market after the Bendectin and Thalidomide incidents, led to the
hasty development of unsafe intrauterine devices like the Dalkon Shield.2 27
Moreover, while liability exposure originally encouraged further research
that helped bring problems to light, it now has virtually halted research on
oral contraceptives and has dissuaded the development of other contracep-
tives,228 especially chemical ones, which are viewed as posing a greater risk
of birth defects.2 9 In fact, no truly new chemical contraceptives have been
developed in the United States since 1968, and the chemical formula for
steroidal oral contraceptives has not changed since 1976.230 The possibility
of birth defects and the fear of liability that stems from that possibility, il-
lustrated by the Bendectin and Thalidomide incidents, led one pharmaceuti-
cal company president to comment, "Who in his right mind would work on
[developing] a product today that would be used by pregnant women?,2 31
Practitioners, echoing this sentiment, have pointed out that virtually no re-
search has been done to determine what drugs are safe for pregnant women
and their unborn children.232
cians nationwide, urging them to prescribe pills with the lowest levels of estrogen possible.
Id.
224 Jackson, supra note 122, at 209 n.62 (citing Michael A. Pretl & Heather A. Osborne,
Trends in U.S. Drug Product Liability--The Plaintiff's Perspective, in PRODUCT LIABILITY,
INSURANCE AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMPARISON 109,




27 See, e.g., Michael A. Preti & Heather A. Osborne, Trends in U.S. Drug Product Li-
ability-The Plaintif's Perspective, in PRODUCT LIABILITY, INSURANCE AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMPARISON 109, 113 (Geraint G.
Howells ed., 1991).
2 8See HUBER, supra note 147, at 155.
29 The Thalidomide injuries made it clear that drugs taken by a pregnant woman can
cross the placenta.
73°See HUBER, supra note 147, at 155, 168. The chemical composition of oral contracep-
tives has remained unchanged despite the fact that oral contraceptives, the most convenient
and effective form of birth control, currently cannot be used by many women because of side
effects such as nausea, dizziness, etc.
2'Id. at 155.
232 Today Show, supra note 182.
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This lack of research has resulted in some women being told not to
have children and others having to suffer through pregnancy without the use
of any medication. Women with diabetes or other medical conditions re-
quiring regular medication have often been told not to have children be-
cause of potential dangers posed to their unborn children by their• 233
medication. Moreover, pregnant women are often warned not to take any
medication, including aspirin, during pregnancy because the medical com-
munity simply does not know what dangers, if any, these products pose tounborn .234
unborn babies. In the current litigation climate, the sentiment expressed
by that pharmaceutical company president will continue to inhibit research
into the effects drugs have on unborn children.
2. AIDS
Discomfort during pregnancy and increases in unwanted pregnancies,
especially among teenagers, are important concerns, but so, especially to-
day, is the chilling effect liability fears have had on the development of
vaccines and drugs to help fight human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the
virus that causes acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).2 35
Knowing that any AIDS vaccine will likely have some side effects236 and
fearing the potential liability arising from those side effects, manufacturers
have been reluctant to expend the large amount of money necessary to re-
search and develop these vaccines.237 Moreover, even if an effective AIDS
vaccine is developed, private pharmaceutical companies will have to find
insurers before they would dare market the product.238 Finding insurers
may prove difficult in the present liability climate especially given the ex-
ample of the swine flue vaccine episode.239 The use of drugs and vaccines
that may help alleviate the painful conditions associated with AIDS or help
prevent the spread of the disease have also been inhibited by liability fears.
For example, Thalidomide has proven helpful in eliminating severe ulcers
in AIDS patients but due to liability fears associated with it, this 'drug of in-




235Deborah M. Barnes, Will an AIDS Vaccine Bankrupt the Company That Makes It?,
233 SCIENCE 1905 (1986) (noting that pharmaceutical companies may be less willing to in-
vest money in production of AIDS vaccine in legal climate where lawsuits against manu-
facturers are richly rewarded); Donald P. Francis & John C. Petricciani, The Prospects for
and Pathways Toward a Vaccine for AIDS, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1586, 1587 (1985) (rec-
ognizing liability concerns as major reason why companies may be reluctant to invest large
amounts of money in developing AIDS vaccine).236 MOSt vaccines have some side effects.
27 Smith, supra note 152, at 207.
238 See HuBER, supra note 147, at 230; see supra Part III.C.
2g9 See supra Part III.B.2.240See Ready, supra note 173 (discussing some experimental uses of Thalidomide).
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vaccine might help prevent mothers who are HIV-positive from transferring
the virus to their children in utero.241 However, there is the possibility that
using such a vaccine during pregnancy may cause birth defects. 242 Fear of
potential liability suits arising from birth defects have caused companies
like MicroGeneSys to postpone tests of this vaccine in HIV-infected
women.243 Concerns over liability exposure have caused other companies
like Genentech temporarily to stop even general research on vaccines that
may prevent HIV and AIDS.24
3. Orphan Drugs
The next casualty of uncertain liability could be "orphan drugs." Or-
phan drugs are drugs used to treat rare diseases, such as AIDS, Parkinson's
disease, and certain types of cancer.245 The market for these drugs is small,
and profits are relatively low. Moreover, because the United States has be-
come a market in which pharmaceutical companies face crippling product
liability awards, manufacturers stopped selling certain drugs aimed at
fighting these conditions. 46 To counter the disincentive to manufacture or-
phan drugs and sell them in the United States, in 1983, the U.S. Congress
passed the Orphan Drug Act,247 which was designed to encourage the de-
velopment and availability of orphan drugs. It offered monetary incentives
to pharmaceutical companies that would "adopt" and sponsor the develop-
ment of an orphan drug. 48 Although critics have noted that determining the
safety of orphan drugs presented unique problems due to a lack of qualified
persons to participate in clinical trials,24 Congress did not provide special
protection from state law-governed orphan drug liability claims. 20 Nearly
one-fifth of the forty-two orphan drugs developed between 1983 and 1989
have already faced liability claims.251 Orphan drugs are already higher-risk
products with lower-profit potential. Despite governmental support, the
241 Jon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS Vaccines?, 256 SCIENCE 168, 170 (1992).
242 1d.
243Id. The company eventually will conduct the tests but only after moving them from
Tennessee to Connecticut where a new law offers substantial legal protection to companies
conducting such tests. Id.
244Id. Genetech later resumed the research program after the California legislature passed
a law protecting companies from liability if subjects received adequate warnings of the test's
risks. Id.
245Carolyn H. Asbury, The Orphan Drug Act: The First 7 Years, 265 JAMA 893, 894
(1991).246See HUBER, supra note 147, at 159. Thalidomide is one example and botulinum, a
substance used to control eye-twitching disease, is another. See id.
24721 U.S.C. § 360aa to -ee (1994).
248 See Asbury, supra note 245.
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continued threat of uncertain liability may cause orphan drug sponsors to
remove their products from the market and stop researching the develop-
ment of new products to treat rare diseases.
IV. MOVING TOWARD INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION
AND AN INTERNATIONAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION
A. Introduction
No matter what the product liability standard is, there will never be
uniformity in consumer recovery if regimes individually apply and enforce
that liability standard, as interpretations will always vary. Thus, as long as
the United States, the European Union, and Japan continue to decide phar-
maceutical product liability cases individually, uncertainty will remain. It
is this inevitable inconsistency and uncertainty that creates problems in the
international pharmaceutical market.
The United States, the European Union, and Japan all have govern-
mental agencies that are responsible for regulating the manufacture and
distribution of pharmaceutical products.5 2 These agencies govern nearly
every aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, labeling, and distribution
of pharmaceutical products. 3 The regulation processes in these regimes
are already similar, and in the recent past, these three regimes have begun
working together to coordinate the regulation requirements for new drug
approvals.4 These efforts at harmonization have laid the foundation for a
new type of international regulatory agency, and provide an excellent model
for the creation of a new international drug administration.
1. Background on Regulation in the United States
In the United States, no pharmaceutical product may be marketed in
interstate commerce until it has been approved by the FDA.255 In order to
receive that approval, a pharmaceutical company must go through several
steps. First, the company must develop and test its product using the stan-
dards of good laboratory procedures promulgated by the FDA.25  Second,
the company must file an Investigational New Drug Application (IND).217
The lND will provide the procedures the company must follow during its
clinical testing phase when the components of the drug are analyzed and the
52These agencies are: the FDA, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products, and the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau, respectively.253Kanusky, supra note 9, at 665.
2See supra Parts IV.B. and C.255See Kanusky, supra note 9, at 668.256See 21 C.F.R. §§ 58.1-.219 (1997).257 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.1-145.
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safety and effectiveness of the drug are studied.25 8 Third, the company
must file a New Drug Application (NDA) which details the results of the
clinical testing.25 9 Finally, the FDA must review the application and ap-
prove it if there is substantial evidence that indicates the drug will have its
predicted effect.260 Even after a drug receives approval, it is still subject to
FDA regulations that require companies to report all adverse drug reac-
tions261 and, in some cases, continue clinical testing to determine the cause
of those adverse reactions.262 Moreover, pharmaceutical manufacturers in
the United States must submit to inspections of their manufacturing facili-
ties by the FDA at least once every two years.263
2. Background on Regulation in the European Union
The European Union's equivalent to the FDA is the European Agency
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (hereinafter the Agency).2 ' The
Agency is responsible for coordinating the evaluation of a drug's quality,
safety, and efficacy and approving new products for the market.2 5s After an
application is submitted to the Agency, the CPMP, a division of the
Agency, takes responsibility for formulating the opinion of the Agency.2 66
The CPMP reviews the documentation regarding a drug's quality, safety,
and efficacy and may require further testing or inspections of a manufac-
turing facility before granting approval. 67 If the Agency denies approval,
no Member State may market the product.268 As in the United States, even
after a drug receives approval, manufacturers and Member States must en-
sure adverse drug reactions are reported to the Agency. 69
258 See Kanusky, supra note 9, at 670-71.
2-"21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1994). A company can file an Abbreviated New Drug Applica-
tion if it is marketing a generic version of a pre-existing product that is already FDA ap-
proved. Kanusky, supra note 9, at 671.
26021 U.S.C. § 355(d).
261 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1997).262See 21 C.F.R. § 312.85.261 See 21 U.S.C. § 360(h).
264The Agency was formed in 1995, when the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal
Products (CPMP) joined with the Committee for Veterinary Medicinal Products. See Coun-
cil Reg. No. 2309/93 (EEC), art. 49, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 2.265 d. art. 51. Before 1995, the Agency did not grant product approval itself. Each
Member State in which a product was to be marketed had to approve a product. See
Kanusky, supra note 9, at 680. Companies could either file a multi-state application
whereby a special application was sent to all Member States for approval, or a concertation
application whereby a single application was sent to one Member State who acted as a re-
porter and fielded questions from other Member States. For a discussion of the old system,
see id., at 680-8 1.
266 Council Reg. No. 2309/93/EEC, arts. 4 and 5, 1993 O.J. (L 214) 2.
267Id. arts. 7, 8.
2681d. art. 12.
2691d. arts. 20, 22, 23.
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3. Background on Regulation in Japan
In Japan, the sale and distribution of pharmaceutical products are gov-
erned by the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau, a division of the Japanese
Ministry of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the Bureau).270 The Bureau re-
quires not only that new drugs be approved, but that manufacturing facili-
ties be licensed.271 Pharmaceutical companies must use Bureau-approved
laboratory practices in pre-clinical testing and must report their testing
methods and results. 272  Companies must also report information on the
chemical components of a drug as well as details on the development and
conditions of use of the drug in other countries.273 The process is not com-
plete until the full Bureau has reviewed the application and the Ministry of
Health and Welfare grants approval.274  Once a drug has been approved,
manufacturers are still subject to regulations on labeling and packaging;275
they must report adverse drug reactions, submit the drug to be re-evaluated
when necessary, and allow their manufacturing facilities to be periodically
re-examined.276
B. The Basis for Harmonization
The United States, the European Union, and Japan all utilize similar
processes for the approval of new drugs, and in the last fifteen years the
regulatory agencies of these regimes and others have begun working to-
gether to transform those similarities into a more uniform system of phar-
maceutical regulation.2 77 Initially, these harmonization efforts were small
in scope and were structured as bilateral agreements. For example, in 1990,
the FDA and the Agency 78 agreed on a list of good laboratory and manu-
facturing practices that would govern pharmaceutical companies seeking
approval in either the United States or any Member State of the European
279Union. In 1991, the United States, the European Union, and Japan
270 See 6 ZENTARO KITAGAWA, DOING BusiNEss IN JAPAN § 6.08[1] (1997) (referencing
§ 81 of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law No. 1245 of 1960). The sale and distribution of
drugs in Japan are governed by the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law No. 1245 of 1960 [herein-
after the Law].
2711d. § 6.08[2] (referencing §§ 12 and 14 of the Law). Foreign manufacturers may ap-
ply directly to the Minister of Health and Welfare, but the process for manufacturer approval
remains the same. Id. § 608[2][C] (referencing §§ 19-2 and 19-4 of the Law).
272 See id. § 608[2][A].
274See id. § 608[1].2751d. § 608[6][p3].
2761d. § 6.08[3].
277Kanusky, supra note 9, at 687.278It was still the CPMP at that point.
279FDA and European Commission Discussing GMP Memorandum of Understanding,
Pink Sheet, Apr. 9, 1990, at T&G 4, available in Lexis, GENMED Library, FDC file. The
United States had also made such an agreement with Japan. Id.
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helped co-sponsor a conference to create uniform regulations governing ex-
cipients, the substances used to give drugs appropriate form and consis-
tency.2
80
The most dramatic effort at harmonizing pharmaceutical regulation be-
gan in 1991, with the International Conference on Harmonization of Tech-
nical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
(hereinafter ICH). The ICH focused on creating uniform regulation re-
quirements among the United States, the European Union, and Japan.281
The ICH represents a unique harmonization commitment because it is
backed by both the pharmaceutical industry and the regulatory agencies of
these three regimes."' Moreover, the ICH was not just a one-time confer-
ence; it is an on-going effort at unity.283
C. The ICH: A Model For an International Drug Administration
The ICH provides a unique international, representative perspective on
the pharmaceutical market and offers an excellent framework from which to
structure a new International Drug Administration. The ICH is a represen-
tative body, comprised of several groups including the pharmaceutical
regulatory agencies from the United States, the European Union, and Japan
284
and pharmaceutical manufacturers from each regime. There are three
ICH committees: the Secretariat, the Steering Committee, and the expert
working group.28s The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manu-
286facturers serves as the Secretariat, while two members from each organ-
izing group plus two representatives from the Secretariat comprise the
287Steering Committee. There are also three expert working groups on
safety, quality, and efficacy.288
The five-phase process used by the ICH to promulgate new uniform
regulation requirements provides an effective method of gathering input
from each country and interest group. First, the Steering Committee selects
210 See William J.C. Currie, European Registration: Today, Tomorrow, and Beyond, 30
J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 386, 387 (1990).
281 Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,105 (1992).
282 See The First International Conference on Harmonization, Summary Report 1 (Nov. 5,
1991) (on file with the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
283The ICH has held three meetings. The first was in Europe in 1991, the second in the
United States in 1993, and the third in Japan in 1994. Kanusky, supra note 9, at 691.284 See Martin Bangemann, Welcome, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION 1 (P.F. D'Arcy & D.W.G. Harron, eds., 1992).285See Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,105 (1992).
286STEERING COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONIZATION OF
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR HUMAN USE, ICH
PROCEDURES, Annex 1, para. 6 (Mar. 1992) (on file with the Northwestern Journal of Inter-
national Law & Business) [hereinafter STEERING COMMITTEE].287 Id., at para. 2.288See id, at para. 3; 57 Fed. Reg. 13,105 (1992).
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a topic for discussion, and then a small working group generates a statement
of suggested policies, guidelines, recommendations, and points to con-
sider. ff Second, the working group sends this statement to each regime's
regulatory agency for review. Third, a chosen Reporter analyzes the
comments made by the regulatory agencies and amends the statement which
it gives back to the working group for review before sending it to the
Steering Committee for approval.29' Fourth, a larger expert working group
reviews and revises the statement one final time29 before the fifth phase in
which the Steering Committee recommends the statement for adoption by
the regulatory agencies of the United States, the European Union, and Ja-
pan.29 While ICH regulations are not binding, they represent "a firm po-
litical commitment on the part of the concerned governments.2 94
D. An International Drug Administration
Although not officially labeled as such, the organizing groups of the
ICH effectively act as a type of international regulatory agency for pharma-
ceutical products. The United States, the European Union, and Japan
should use the framework of the ICH and expand their harmonization ef-
forts to form an International Drug Administration (IDA). A multilateral
treaty among these parties establishing the IDA would make their previous
"political commitment" into a more formal obligation.295 The DA would
have the official responsibility of promulgating uniform international re-
quirements for the registration and development of new pharmaceutical
products.
As the international regulatory agency, the IDA would facilitate the
introduction of new products to the international market by requiring phar-
maceutical companies to file a single multi-nation new drug application
with the IDA.29  The IDA would then coordinate the registration process.
It would act as a reporter for the company, respond to individual member
questions, and issue the final approval or denial.297 Once a new product is
approved, pharmaceutical companies would report adverse drug reactions to
the IDA. This would facilitate the collection of more complete, accurate
2 89 STEERING COMMITTEE, supra note 286, at para. 8.
290 THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION, CLOSING REPORT,





294Kanusky, supra note 9, at 695.295 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 26-30, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 at 289, 8 I.L.M. 679, 690-91 (1969).296This would be like a combination of the European Union's old multi-state and con-
certation applications. See supra Part IV.A.2.
297 This procedure is similar to the process currently used in the European Union.
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data and enable the IDA to recognize products that have reached unaccept-
able safety levels which require their removal from the market. Each re-
gime would have access to the same information at the same time. A multi-
nation application process would lower the cost of bringing a new drug to
market. It would reduce current wasteful repetition caused by having to file
separate applications in each regime. It would eliminate the expense of
having to make small but expensive alterations in manufacturing practices,
facilities, reports, and testing procedures for each regime. Moreover, with
truly uniform research, development, testing, and safety standards, it will be
easier for manufacturers to know and satisfy these necessary requirements.
Finally, all products will have the same safety standards and present the
same liability risks regardless of where they are manufactured, which will
provide certainty.
V. AN INTERNATIONAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION: A UNIFORM CURE FOR
UNCERTAINTY IN PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. The IDA: Providing An International Tribunal For Product Liability
The IDA should not only govern pharmaceutical regulation but also
serve as an international administrative tribunal for product liability claims.
In essence, this new system of liability would be a mixture of safety regula-
tion, tort, and workmen's compensation.298 The IDA would set safety stan-
dards to be followed, and if injuries occurred despite these standards, it
would offer a way to compensate consumers for their injuries. In this way,
the IDA would truly serve as a "guardian" of the public health, protecting
citizens from the dangers associated with pharmaceutical products through
both regulation and redress.
Trying to create a new uniform system of product liability is not with-
out its complexities. An argument could be made that cultural differences
between the three regimes will make it difficult, if not impossible, to define
and determine awards; tort law has been described as a "cultural mirror" in
which judicial decisions often reflect the social norms of an individual
country.299 However, this cultural divide is exactly the problem that the
IDA would address. Under the current system of product liability, cultural
and political differences and the fact that judicial decisions often reflect
these differences create uncertainty.? Creating an informed multinational,
multicultural, forum in which to address liability concerns will provide a
consensus view and interpretation. Allowing the IDA tribunal to utilize
298 See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 15-19
(1993) (providing an overview of what each of these systems of laws attempt to do).
29Marshall S. Shapo, The Looking Glass: What Tort Scholarship Can Teach Us About
The American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (1995).300See supra Part II.D.
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more of a workmen's compensation mentality of no fault compensation will
minimize areas of dispute because the approach limits the amount of inter-
pretation usually required in a tort action. Injured consumers will not have
to prove negligence or intent or get bogged down in various standards. All
that will be needed is proof of injury.
An argument could be made that this system will raise preemption
questions, especially in the United States where recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions reveal that FDA regulations do not always preempt state tort ac-
tions.30 1 However, since the IDA would be formed through a multilateral
treaty that would bind each signatory as a nation, it would avoid the pre-
emption questions surrounding domestic federal regulations. A final argu-
ment that could be raised is that the United States, the European Union, and
Japan would be unwilling to cede their authority regarding product liability
to an international body. The reality is that these regimes would not be
giving up their right and authority to protect their citizens. This system
would operate only when companies followed IDA regulations and injuries
occurred despite their adherence to those regulations. Companies which
failed to follow IDA procedures would be subject to suit in domestic fora
just as companies which fail to follow federal regulations in the United
States may face state tort claims as well as federal suits. As with any treaty
or international organization, there will be measures and complexities that
will need to be worked out, but nations are realizing the need for interna-
tional cooperation and collaboration more each day.3 2 For example, under
the dispute settlement mechanisms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATI), 30 3 nations agree to bring their concerns over trade violations
before an international body.
301 See Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (in a case involving the Medical De-
vice Amendments (MDA), state law defective design claims were not preempted despite
federal approval; claims of manufacturer's negligence were not preempted; claims of defec-
tive labeling and marketing were not preempted).3
°
2For example, the European Union will establish a new currency known as the Euro
that will be used by all Member States except Britain, Denmark, and Sweden, which have
opted initially not to use the single currency and Greece, which has not yet met the European
Commission's criteria for inclusion. See Barry James, 11 Countries Approved for Euro in a
Historic Moment for EU, Common Currency Moves Closer, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 26,
1998, at News available in LEXIS, World Library, IHT File; Angus MacKinnon, Brussels
Set to Give Green Light to Il-state Single Currency, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 24, 1998
available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
303 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226
(1994). Under GATT, nations are obliged, though not explicitly bound, to act in good faith
and comply with Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) procedures which include inter-
national determination of trade violations. Id.
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1. The Tribunal Composition
The membership of the IDA, like the ICH, should include representa-
tives from both government and industry, but membership should be ex-
tended to include consumer representation so that the IDA will have a
knowledgeable, representative, global perspective on the pharmaceutical
market.304 The IDA should have a specialized division responsible for
dealing with product liability concerns. It should assess the risks associated
with each product, make judgments about the safety requirements appropri-
ate for each product, and serve as an international tribunal that reviews
product liability claims. This IDA tribunal would serve as a better method
of addressing product liability claims than the current system. It would
provide a knowledgeable, fair forum that reflects the international composi-
tion of the pharmaceutical market and provides the certainty and stability
that current pharmaceutical product liability lacks and so desperately
needs. °5
The IDA tribunal members will have the necessary scientific and tech-
nical background to fully understand pharmaceutical product liability: they
will be familiar with the products; they will have studied the research and
tests; they will know the inherent risks associated with each pharmaceutical
product; and, they will understand the technical medical questions that arise
in pharmaceutical product liability cases. Armed with that knowledge, the
IDA will be a fair judge of pharmaceutical product liability.30 6 The IDA
tribunal as a representative body will be able to understand and empathize
with each section of the pharmaceutical market. It will not be guided to de-
cisions based only on sympathy for the consumer, nor will it be driven
solely by the economic interests of industry or government. It will provide
government, manufacturer, and consumer perspectives in reaching a deci-
sion; thus, no one faction will determine outcomes based on its own inter-
ests. The IDA will provide an international perspective that reflects the
international scope of the pharmaceutical market.
The IDA tribunal will provide much-needed certainty in pharmaceuti-
cal product liability. Both pharmaceutical companies and consumers will
know the forum in which their case will be decided before an injury occurs.
It will not matter where a product was made or bought, and there will be no
"forum shopping" as consumers search for the more friendly jurisdiction. 3°7Most importantly, the IDA tribunal will provide one international standard
304 See supra Part IV. C., expanding on current ICH composition.
305This would resolve the concerns raised in supra Part II.D.306 One of the problems that the IDA would stop, and which is of great concern to foreign
pharmaceutical companies, is that in the United States, juries are thought to base their deci-
sions on sympathy for an injured plaintiff.307See supra Part III.A. Pharmaceutical companies will no longer fear selling products in
the United States because, if injuries occur, they will not have to face a product liability suit
in the United States where liability awards have proven exorbitant. See supra Part III.D.3.
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of recovery for pharmaceutical product liability. There will no longer be
the uncertainty that results when each nation interprets and applies stan-
dards according to its own history, culture, and legal tradition. Instead of
having a standard that is uniform in name only and subject to multiple in-
terpretations by various "triers of facts" there will be one standard formu-
lated from a multinational perspective, and one tribunal acting as judge.
2. The System of Product Liability Under the IDA Tribunal
Taking aspects of each regime's current liability traditions, the IDA
can create a truly effective system for pharmaceutical liability. The IDA
tribunal should serve less as a civil litigation forum and more as a review
board. It should be patterned after the Japanese tradition of rejecting adver-
sarial court battles in favor of conciliatory agreements that redress actual
harm and non-litigation associations that provide compensation without le-
gal action. °8
Recognizing the unique nature of pharmaceutical products, and the im-
portance of balancing their high social value against their inherent risks,
309
the goal of the tribunal should be to compensate consumers for actual harm,
not to punish pharmaceutical companies for injuries beyond their control.
To achieve this goal, the IDA should start by adopting a standard of no-
310 Udrtifault compensation. Under this standard, the tribunal will decide only if a
product caused the consumer's injury. If the product is the proximate cause
of injury, then the consumer will be compensated.
Despite the many differences in application of the current product li-
ability standard, all three regimes have agreed that consumers, injured by a
product, should receive compensation for their injuries.3 Injured consum-
ers should receive compensation to cover personal injury or death, and
enough money to pay their medical expenses. A limited amount of com-
pensation for pain and suffering seems appropriate when the IDA, using its
knowledge of the effects caused by a drug, determines what a reasonable
amount of pain and suffering compensation should be. However, punitive
damages should not be allowed because they are designed not to compen-
sate the injured consumer but to punish the pharmaceutical manufacturer.
308 See supra Part II.C.309This goal is similar to what the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A tried to do
in Comment k.31 0This goal is similar to the standard used in countries like New Zealand, Sweden, and
Finland which utilize a no-fault insurance system created by agreement between the pharma-
ceutical industry and insurance companies. See Jackson, supra note 122, at 225-26 (dis-
cussing this no-fault insurance system). A similar standard is also utilized by the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and workman's compensation system. Id. at 223. These ex-
amples could be models for the structure of an IDA compensation scheme.
31This belief was the impetus for adopting the strict liability standard. See supra Parts
III. A., B., and C.
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Pharmaceutical companies should not be punished as long as they have
followed IDA regulations and have done everything they can to make their
products safe and effective so that injury results, not from any fault of the
company, but from the inherent dangers of pharmaceutical products.312
The United States, the European Union, and Japan would not give up
the right to protect their citizens from fraud, negligence, or recklessness, but
rather, would provide a more effective method of compensation for no-fault
injuries. Companies that do not follow IDA regulations; that are negligent
or reckless and fail to maintain appropriate manufacturing and laboratory
practices; or, that defraud the IDA by falsifying their applications or doc-
toring their research results will still be subject to the laws of the injured
consumer's country.
Compensation awards will be paid out of a trust fund financed by
pharmaceutical companies operating on the international market. There are
two methods of financing this trust. The first is an excise tax, similar to that
used in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, imposed on pharma-
ceutical manufacturers for each product they sell.313 The tax would fluctu-
ate based on the number and severity of claims filed with the IDA, and
there would be a cap on the tax to prevent it from rising too high.314 The
second method would be to impose a standard fee on pharmaceutical manu-
facturers. 315 The fee would be a fixed percentage, based on annual pay-outs
from the fund.3 16 The fee could be announced a year in advance, which
would enable manufacturers to better predict their costs and plan for the
future. Thus, manufacturers who incur greater liability expenses pay the
same amount as manufacturers who have lower costs. The ability to accu-
rately predict costs and operate free from uncertainty will reduce prices and
encourage manufacturers to research new products and develop orphan
drugs.
B. Benefits of an IDA Tribunal System of Product Liability
The current system of pharmaceutical product liability is inefficient
and inequitable and has created: uncertainty and fear in the pharmaceutical
industry, market distortion,317 increased costs,318 and a chill in the develop-
312 See supra Part I.
313 This parallels the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. See supra Part III.C.2 and
accompanying notes.
14 With a more stable, certain system of liability and reasonable liability expenses, the
tax will probably not increase to the extreme levels that are currently causing vaccine prices
to soar. See supra Part III.C.2.
31 Sally-Anne Danner, The Vaccine Ailment: A Cure to Encourage Litigation-Shy Phar-
maceutical Companies to Manufacture an AIDS Vaccine, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y.
67, 80 (1993).316
id
°317See supra Part III.B.
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ment of new products.319 The IDA tribunal system would encourage effi-
cient, equitable liability recovery. It would eliminate uncertainty and fear
in pharmaceutical product liability, stabilize the market, and protect con-
sumers.
No-fault compensation based on actual injury and with restrictions on
non-compensatory damages creates certainty and stability by providing re-
lief to injured consumers without unjustly punishing manufacturers. It
avoids enormous multi-million dollar awards that increase costs and create
liability fears that cause pharmaceutical companies to stop manufacturing
and marketing current products and halt or slow research and development
of new products.320
While awards under this no-fault compensation system would be
smaller, the payments would be more immediate and meritorious claims
would not be unnecessarily reduced by the fees generated by lengthy legal
battles.321 Under the current system, after an award is granted, actual com-
pensation can be delayed for years by continued litigation. Moreover, the
costs of this continued litigation has to be deducted from the actual award
and may significantly reduce actual compensation to the consumer. Imme-
diate payments will allow injured consumers to keep up with medical ex-
penses incurred from the injury, and with an administrative tribunal system,
excessive court costs and delays can be avoided.322
Using a trust fund financed equally by pharmaceutical companies to
pay liability awards stabilizes the market, encourages safety, and provides
an incentive for development.323 The fund spreads liability risks and costs
evenly among manufacturers. The fixed rate of payment allows pharma-
ceutical companies to more accurately predict their costs and will help keep
consumer prices reasonable and stable. 324 As the fee to finance the trust is
based on annual pay-outs from the fund, the fewer claims brought that re-
quire pay-outs, the less money each company must contribute each year.
Fewer expenditures means more profits, and this gives manufacturers an-
other incentive to produce safe products that will not incur liability awards
from the IDA.325 Moreover, when companies pay a blanket fee regardless
of their liability exposure, they have an incentive to develop new products
318 See supra Part III.C.319See supra Part III.D.320See supra Part III.
321 See Danner, supra note 315, at 78.322 See id.
323 See id. at 79.
324Id.; see supra Part III.C.
32sThe IDA would be able to impose an increase on a company that abused the equal
payment structure of the tax fund; thus, companies would have an incentive to make sure
that their products did not require excessive payouts from the fund.
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to make a return on that fee.326 Thus, the IDA tribunal system of product
liability will prevent distortions in the pharmaceutical market, decrease
costs for both manufacturers and consumers, and encourage the develop-
ment of new products.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the United States felt that its negligence standard for product li-
ability was inefficient and unfair, it adopted a new strict liability stan-
dard. 27 When the European Union felt individual Member States'
determination of product liability standards was inefficient and caused trade
problems, it adopted a more uniform system of strict liability modeled afterthe United States. 328 When Japan felt that its product liability system was
unresponsive to consumers, it too changed to a more uniform system of
strict liability patterned after the United States and the European Union.329
Unfortunately, the problems of inefficiency and inequity continue. Despite,
or perhaps because of the individual efforts of these three regimes, product
liability in the pharmaceutical industry has not achieved the uniformity it
needs to eliminate distortions in the market, decrease costs, and encourage
the development of new products. Thus, the United States, the European
Union, and Japan should continue to evolve their product liability systems.
They should take the next step toward harmonization and, this time, create a
truly international, uniform product liability system for the pharmaceutical
industry. The IDA will provide that system. The IDA will help consumers
without hurting pharmaceutical companies. It will eliminate uncertainty in
product liability cases and cure the negative effects caused by that uncer-
tainty. The United States, the European Union, and Japan must not shy
away from international uniformity in product liability. It is time to let the
pharmaceutical product liability system break away from domestic uncer-
tainties and catch up with this international industry.
326 /d"
327 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14.328 See Directive, supra note 38.329See Liability Law, supra note 79.
